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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
Indigenous people in Bolivia have historically been excluded 
from the social and political life of their country, where 
socioeconomic differences are highly correlated with ethnic 
identities.  However, after a serious political crisis, in 2005 
an indigenous leader was elected President in an 
unprecedented election, and the country has since faced 
aggressive social and political transformations.  Using 
survey data that ranges from 1998 to 2010, this paper shows 
some relevant changes in the perceptions and attitudes of 
indigenous people towards the democratic regime, its 
political institutions, and other citizens.  The trends shown 
suggest that the average relationship of indigenous citizens 
with the state and its institutions has improved both in 
relative and in absolute terms.  However, levels of political 
tolerance among indigenous Bolivians do not seem to have 
increased at the same rate as those of non-indigenous 
Bolivians. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In December 2005, Evo Morales was elected President of 
Bolivia in a landslide election, in which he received a 
historic 54 percent of the national vote.  Morales, an 
indigenous Aymara from the Bolivian Altiplano and leader 
of the coca growers‘ union, had campaigned on a strong anti-
neoliberal discourse, and on the promotion of indigenous 
peoples‘ rights. 
 
Morales and his party, Movimiento Al Socialismo (MAS), 
came to power after a very serious national political crisis, in 
which traditional parties and leaders lost credibility, and the 
legitimacy of the political regime itself was questioned.  In 
fact, the previous President elected by popular vote, Gonzalo 
Sánchez de Lozada, was forced to resign in October 2003 by 
massive popular protests in which indigenous groups played 
a central role.  His Vice President and successor, Carlos 
Mesa, had the same fate less than two years later. 
 
Morales is the first indigenous President in a country where a 
substantial proportion of the population is considered to be 
indigenous.  MAS itself is more a coalition of social 
movements, including indigenous organizations, than a 
political party in the traditional sense (Zuazo 2008).  
Morales‘ statist and redistributive policies are popular with 
the poorer sectors of the population, among whom the 
indigenous have historically represented a large share 
(Jimenez, Landa and Yañez 2006; Molina B. 2005; PNUD 
2004).  During the last five years, Morales has led a 
transformation process which has included, among other 
relevant reforms, the re-foundation of Bolivia as a 
plurinational state, in which indigenous cultures and social 
forms are supposed to have the same value as western social 
and political institutions. 
 
In this context, it is very likely that the perceptions of 
indigenous people in regards to the country‘s political 
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institutions have improved during the last few years.  This 
paper attempts to test this general hypothesis, focusing on a 
set of variables relevant to the health and stability of a 
democratic regime.  The variables selected for the analyses 
are the following: support for the democratic regime, 
support for the political system, voting participation, and 
political tolerance.  These variables are closely related to 
individuals‘ perceptions of rights, equal and fair access, and 
social inclusion, which are all crucial components to the 
existence of modern democratic societies. 
 
The first two variables, support for democracy and support 
for the political system, can be considered as measures of 
legitimacy.  Support for the democratic regime is the support 
that citizens offer to democracy as a form of government.  
This is a form of legitimacy of the regime itself, the level of 
commitment that citizens have towards democracy as the 
―best form of government,‖ in its Churchillean definition.  
 
Support for the political system, on the other hand, refers to 
what the specialized literature usually conceptualizes as 
―diffuse support‖ (Easton 1975; Seligson 1983); this is the 
level of legitimacy of the institutions that form the political 
system.  While support for democracy is a more abstract 
commitment to the regime, support for the political system is 
more concrete as it refers to a set of specific institutions. 
 
The third variable refers to a more active dimension of 
citizenship: political participation in national elections.  
Citizens who vote are a central part of the polity, and their 
participation means that they are actually included in the 
political system.  Despite the fact that voting is compulsory 
in Bolivia, enforcement is very weak or non-existent, 
particularly in rural areas; so individuals who vote are 
actually those who decide to do so.  This decision accounts 
for at least a minimal level of engagement in national 
politics. 
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Finally, the fourth variable chosen for this research, political 
tolerance, focuses on the horizontal relationship between 
citizens, instead of the relationship between citizens and the 
State, as in the previous cases.  As a long strand of research 
has shown, the existence of politically tolerant citizens is one 
of the social conditions for liberal democracies. 
 
Data employed for this project come from the Latin 
American Public Opinion Project‘s (LAPOP‘s) database for 
Bolivia, which includes biannual surveys conducted since 
1998 on probability samples of approximately 3,000 cases 
each that represent the national population.
1
  Interviews are 
conducted in the Spanish, Quechua and Aymara languages.  
Because of their temporality and comparability across time, 
the data provide the ideal setting for observing changes in 
the average perceptions of different subpopulation groups in 
Bolivia. 
 
The analyses conducted for this paper seek to identify 
statistically significant differences for the indigenous 
subpopulation across time in the chosen dependent 
variables.
2
  Different measures to define the indigenous 
population are used throughout the paper, but in most cases, 
and unless otherwise noted, results are independent of which 
grouping variable is used.  While most results are presented 
using bivariate graphs, all of the results have been tested for 
independence from other potentially relevant effects through 
multivariate linear and logistic regressions, which are 
omitted from the paper for reasons of space. 
 
                                                 
 
1
More information on LAPOP and its database can be found at the 
project‘s website, www.lapopsurveys.org.  Complete descriptions of the 
samples employed for each Bolivian study are published within their 
respective reports. 
2
All analyses conducted in this research take into account the complex 
nature of the samples from which the data comes from, using this 
information for the appropriate calculation of statistical error (Kish and 
Frankel 1974; Knott 1991). 
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THE IDENTITY RIDDLE: WHO IS INDIGENOUS IN 
BOLIVIA? 
 
The first question that needs to be answered when 
indigenous populations are studied is who we are talking 
about when we talk about indigenous people.  As ethnic 
categories are usually contested, the boundaries separating 
them tend to be blurry (Abdelal, et al. 2006; Chandra 2006; 
Corntassel 2003).  In order to identify trends in the 
perceptions of a particular group, in this case indigenous 
people in Bolivia, a methodological decision regarding the 
definition of this population has to be made.  
 
There are different theoretically legitimate approaches to 
defining membership within the category referred to as the 
indigenous population.  At least three of these approaches 
are often used by researchers and by government institutions 
in Bolivia.  One of them is self-identification on a racial 
basis; the second is self-identification on a cultural basis; and 
the third one is identification of the indigenous population by 
the languages they speak, or the language in which they first 
learned to communicate during childhood. 
 
The Bolivian government itself, however, despite its 
emphasis on the rights of the indigenous population, does not 
have an official operative definition of who the indigenous 
people are.  While the 2009 Constitution defines the 
indigenous peoples and nations as the communities that 
share culture, institutions, history, and territory, and pre-date 
the Spanish conquest (Art. 30), there is no official 
methodological definition to operationalize this concept.  
This lack of a practical definition has meant that different 
state institutions have been employing different 
methodological strategies to identify the indigenous 
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population according to their own views and requirements, 
and without the existence of a universally applied criterion.
3
  
 
In terms of the size of the indigenous population in the 
country, the three approaches produce strikingly different 
results.  Using the cultural identification item, almost three-
fourths of the Bolivian population could be counted as 
―indigenous‖ in 2010.  However, using the racial 
identification measure, only one-fifth of the national 
population would be a part of the group.  And if the first 
language measure is to be considered, around a quarter of the 
population should be counted as indigenous.
4
 
 
All three methodological alternatives address a particular 
dimension of the complex phenomenon of ethnic identities.  
Under the racial classification, categories comprising the 
non-indigenous population are mestizos, whites, and the 
smaller afro-descendent population.  Under the cultural 
identification classification, non-indigenous are those 
individuals who do not feel that they belong to any of the 
native groups in Bolivia.  When the language variable is 
used, the cultural origin of the person, as well as their 
membership in a particular linguistic community, is taken 
                                                 
3
 For example, the Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE), responsible 
for the Census, included in the 2001 Census the cultural identification 
item; however, INE has employed language spoken as the main marker 
of the indigenous population in their official socio-demographic study 
about indigenous people, using the results of the latest Census (INE 
2003); other official publications (UDAPE-PNUD 2006) have employed 
other methods, such as the Condición Étnico Lingüística (CEL), a 
gradual measure of indigenousness that combines cultural identification 
with an indigenous group with language spoken and first language 
(Molina B. and Albó 2006). 
4
 These substantially divergent results, which have been noted elsewhere 
(Moreno 2008; Moreno, et al. 2008; Seligson, et al. 2006), sparked the 
national debate over the ethnic composition of the Bolivian population, 
and its consequences for public policies.  For part of the debate see (Albó 
2004; Albó 2009; Laserna 2004; Lavaud 2007; Lavaud and Lestage 
2002; Moreno 2007; Zavaleta 2009). 
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into account, and the non-indigenous group is formed by 
individuals who do not share that cultural origin. 
 
The LAPOP questionnaires, applied in the surveys 
conducted in Bolivia, have employed since 2004 items that 
provide information on the three approaches.  Research for 
this paper has employed alternatively the three options, and 
in most cases results are consistent across measures.  The 
exact formulation of each of the three items, as well as their 
results as proportions for 2010, are presented in the 
appendix. 
 
SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY 
 
It seems evident that a consolidated democracy requires that 
citizens think of it as the best form of government; 
democracy needs to be ―the only game in town‖ (Linz 1990; 
Przeworski 1991) in the minds of all, or at least most, 
citizens.  And this agreement has to be shared by members of 
all relevant political parties and tendencies, as well by 
members of different social groups; the agreement of 
democracy as the only game in town has to be shared across 
all socially relevant cleavages, including ethnic, economic 
and political cleavages. 
 
In the case of Bolivia, indigenous people showed 
significantly lower levels of agreement with the idea that 
―despite its problems, democracy is the best form of 
government‖ when compared to non-indigenous people 
before the first election of Morales in 2005.  But since the 
survey conducted in 2006, the average levels of support for 
democracy are identical.  This trend is evident when all three 
variables employed for defining indigenous identity are 
considered alternatively.  
 
The following graph presents the evolution of the average 
support for democracy for individuals who had an 
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indigenous language as their first language during childhood 
compared to respondents who spoke a language other than an 
indigenous one as their first language.  Differences are 
statistically significant in 2004, and the two averages are 
indistinct for 2006, 2008 and 2010.  It is worth noting that 
after a consistent increase between 2004 and 2006 and 
between 2006 and 2008, support for democracy has stopped 
growing in the 2008-2010 period for both subpopulations. 
 
Graph 1: Temporal evolution of support for democracy for 
indigenous and non-indigenous, 2004-2010 
 
The average satisfaction with democracy has also varied in a 
different way for indigenous and non-indigenous individuals 
in Bolivia during the last 6 years.  Since Evo Morales took 
office in 2006, satisfaction has increased significantly – by 
more than 10 points in the 0 to 100 scale of the variable – for 
indigenous people, while this increase has been much milder 
and less constant for non-indigenous people.  The following 
graph shows this trend across time; groups are defined by 
self-identification as indigenous in a racial dimension. 
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Graph 2: Evolution of satisfaction with democracy for            
 indigenous and non-indigenous, 2004-2010 
 
 
These findings show that, since Evo Morales came to power, 
the perceptions that indigenous citizens have about 
democracy in Bolivia have improved.  This improvement has 
taken place both in absolute terms and in relative terms – 
when perceptions for indigenous individuals are compared to 
the average of that for the non-indigenous population.  Both 
variables treated here show higher averages for the 
indigenous population in 2010 than in 2004, as well as an 
improvement in the relative position compared to the non-
indigenous.  In the case of support for democracy, the trend 
has been towards evening the average support, while in the 
case of satisfaction with democracy, an initial similar 
average has turned into a more satisfied indigenous 
population. 
 
While that is the general trend, there are relevant differences 
between indigenous groups in their satisfaction with 
democracy in 2010.  Mean satisfaction with democracy is 10 
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points higher in the 0 to 100 scale for people who identify 
themselves as Quechua and Aymara versus the average 
satisfaction for people who feel apart of other indigenous 
groups
5
; these results are presented in detail in the appendix.  
This finding seems to be related with the fact that the MAS 
government has been more actively associated with 
indigenous organizations from the western highlands of the 
country, where Aymara and Quechua are the main groups.  
In fact, the relationship of the MAS government with 
indigenous people from the lowlands has been increasingly 
tense, and that was reflected through several demonstrations 
organized by the CIDOB against the Morales government in 
2010.
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SUPPORT FOR THE POLITICAL SYSTEM 
 
The variable employed for measuring support for the 
political system is an index composed of five items in the 
LAPOP questionnaires:  the belief that courts guarantee a 
free trial; the level of respect for the country‘s political 
institutions; the perception of basic rights being protected; 
the pride of living under the country‘s political regime; and 
the idea that the political system has to be supported. 
7
 This 
index has been employed consistently and satisfactorily by 
                                                 
5
 Other indigenous groups refer to the country‘s smaller indigenous 
populations that mainly inhabit the Eastern lowlands of the country; these 
groups include the Guaraní, Chiquitano, and Mojeño as the most 
important categories. 
6
 CIDOB is the Confederación Indígena del Oriente de Bolivia, the 
organization that represents most lowland indigenous people in Bolivia. 
7 
The questions are originally based on a 1 to 10 scale in which 1 means 
that the person does not share the proposed idea at all and 10 that the 
person fully agrees with the idea; the index resulting in the combination 
of the five items adopts a 0 to 100 scale. The exact formulation of items 
in the questionnaire is included in the appendix. 
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different studies (see, for example Booth and Seligson 2009; 
Seligson 2002.8 
 
In the years previous to the election of Evo Morales, 
indigenous people showed lower averages of support for the 
political system than non-indigenous individuals.  This 
difference was statistically significant in 2000 and 2002.  
Since 2008, individuals who identify as indigenous show 
significantly higher levels of system support than non-
indigenous citizens.  The following graph illustrates this 
trend. 
 
Graph 3: Evolution of mean support for the political system 
for indigenous and non-indigenous, 1998-2010 
 
 
 The grouping variable considered in the previous graph is 
identification as indigenous in the racial self-identification 
                                                 
8 The technical construction of the index shows that the items are highly 
correlated among them; Cronbach’s alpha for the index using the 2010 
Bolivian data is 0.8, which shows good internal consistency.  
12 
 
question employed in the LAPOP questionnaire; the trend is 
similar for the other two alternatives for defining the 
indigenous population (cultural identification and first 
language).  Additionally, and in contrast to what was 
observed with satisfaction with democracy, there are no 
relevant differences between particular indigenous identities 
in 2010 when their average levels of system support are 
considered. 
 
It is also relevant that in 2000 the average support for the 
political system was lower among indigenous people 
independent of other socioeconomic factors, such as income 
or level of education, which are correlated with ethnic 
identity; conversely, system support is higher among 
indigenous in 2010 independent of the same factors.  This 
suggests that, even considering the significant general 
increase in legitimacy of the political system, it is among 
indigenous people where this change has been more 
dramatic. 
 
VOTING PARTICIPATION 
 
Indigenous people have historically been excluded from the 
Bolivian political system.  Until the mid-20
th
 century, voting 
was restricted to literate individuals who owned some 
property, which de facto excluded most of the indigenous 
population in the country.  Even until the Ley de 
Participación Popular in 1994, participation for most 
indigenous people was limited to national elections, as 
municipal elections were absent from rural areas where the 
majority of the indigenous population lived.  Additionally, 
voting participation in Bolivia requires not only a valid ID, 
which were harder to obtain and mostly useless for other 
purposes in rural indigenous communities, but also that 
individuals register as voters in a State office, which is 
usually absent in rural areas. 
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Voter turnout was lower among indigenous people in the 
2002 election, according to responses to the 2004 survey; 
since the 2005 election, differences between indigenous and 
non-indigenous groups in terms of voter turnout seem to 
have leveled out, as they are statistically indistinct since 
2006.  The following graph shows the trends for both groups.  
 
Graph 4: Evolution of voting participation for indigenous and 
non-indigenous individuals, 2004-2010 
 
 
There is more than one explanation for this increase in the 
relative proportion of voters among indigenous people.  One 
has to do with the aggressive identification policy adopted by 
the MAS administration; thousands of individuals who did 
not hold a national ID card were registered by mobile 
brigades formed for this purpose.  This means that the 
potential number of voters increased in the country both 
among indigenous and non-indigenous citizens; yet, as the 
brigades worked mostly in rural and poor urban areas (where 
in fact documentation was lower), the rate of documentation 
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for indigenous people was higher than that for non-
indigenous individuals. 
 
A second complementary explanation of increased voter 
turnout in recent elections is linked to the interest that 
citizens show in politics, which has also increased 
significantly as a national average between 2008 and 2010.  
Interest in politics, higher among those who identify as 
Aymara, has increased as a consequence of the relevance of 
the most recent elections, in which the continuation of the 
transformation process led by Morales was at stake.  Interest 
in politics was a robust predictor of voter participation in 
Bolivia during 2010, showing that an increase in interest 
results in an increase in turnout. 
 
POLITICAL TOLERANCE 
 
Political tolerance means the acceptance of people‘s rights to 
incur in practices that we do not like.  Tolerance is a value 
needed for liberal democracies (Prothro and Grigg 1960), in 
which citizens can criticize or oppose institutions without 
having to fear negative consequences or retaliation from 
others. 
 
The measure used for political tolerance is an index 
composed of four items that refers to the rights of individuals 
who are critical of the country‘s political system; it measures 
citizens‘ perceptions of these individuals‘ right to vote, their 
right to participate in peaceful demonstrations, their right to 
run for office, and their right to give a public speech on TV.
9
 
 
                                                 
9
 The questions are originally based on a 1 to 10 scale in which 1 means 
that the person does not share the proposed idea at all and 10 that the 
person fully agrees with the idea; the index resulting in the combination 
of the five items adopts a 0 to 100 metric. The exact formulation of items 
in the questionnaire is included in the appendix. The tolerance index has 
a high internal consistency, with a Cronbach‘s alpha for the 2010 
Bolivian data of 0.87.  
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Previous studies have shown that the levels of tolerance are, 
in general, low for Bolivia when compared to other Latin 
American countries (though a positive trend has been 
recorded across time) (Moreno, et al. 2010; Moreno and 
Seligson 2006).  The graph below shows the evolution of the 
mean tolerance for individuals who identify themselves as 
part of an indigenous group and for the rest of the 
population. 
 
Graph 5: Evolution of average political tolerance for 
indigenous and non-indigenous subpopulations, 2004-2010 
 
 
The average levels of tolerance have increased in the country 
during the six-year period between 2004 and 2010.  But this 
trend does not seem to apply to individuals who identify 
themselves as apart of an indigenous group, whose levels of 
tolerance have not increased substantially during this 
interval.  In 2004, indigenous Bolivians showed higher levels 
of political tolerance than non-indigenous, and this 
difference was statistically significant and robust even when 
the effects of socioeconomic factors such as income, 
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education, gender and age were held constant.  Six years 
later, the average level of tolerance for indigenous is almost 
the same as in 2004, while it has increased by more than 10 
points within the 0 to 100 tolerance scale among people who 
do not identify themselves as apart of an indigenous group. 
The multiple regression results for 2004 and 2010 are 
included in the appendix of this article. 
 
With slight differences, a similar trend can be observed when 
the other two variables that can be employed for defining 
indigenous people are considered.  Additionally, individuals 
who identify themselves as apart of the Aymara people 
group show slightly lower levels of tolerance than Quechuas 
and other native groups. 
 
As the variable that measures tolerance defines ―those who 
oppose the political system‖ as the group to be tolerated, it 
could be argued that the high level of support that indigenous 
people confer to both the Evo Morales administration and the 
political system in general would explain their lower levels 
of acceptance of the rights of those who oppose the political 
system.  However, a multivariate regression analysis, 
included in the appendix, shows that in 2010 individuals who 
culturally identify themselves as indigenous are less tolerant 
independent of their approval of the Morales administration, 
their level of system support, and relevant socioeconomic 
characteristics, such as education and income. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The evidence discussed in this paper suggests that the 
perceptions and attitudes of indigenous people in Bolivia 
have been deeply influenced by the Evo Morales government 
and the subsequent state transformation process led by the 
MAS.  This impact has not been transitory or limited to the 
period immediately after the Morales election; many of the 
trends that were initially visible in 2006 could still be 
observed four years later. 
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Indigenous Bolivians now have a better relationship with the 
country‘s democratic regime, its political system, and its 
most relevant institutions than the one which they had prior 
to the MAS government.  While most indicators of 
legitimacy have displayed increased average levels for the 
country in general, this increase has been sharper among 
indigenous people.  This means that the improvement is 
evident in absolute terms, featuring higher figures amongst 
the relevant indicators for the indigenous subpopulation 
when compared to the period immediately previous to the 
Morales government.  It also means that the improvement 
can be seen in relative terms, when the mean values for 
indigenous people are compared to those for non-indigenous 
citizens. 
 
The improvement in the relationship between indigenous 
people and the Bolivian State has taken place on different 
levels.  Support for democracy has increased, as has the 
average satisfaction with this form of government.  There 
have also been relevant changes in support for the political 
system, an evaluation that includes perceptions about 
fairness; rights being protected; and pride, respect, and 
support for political institutions.  Indigenous people are now 
also more involved in the political system through a better 
relative participation in the quintessential democratic 
institution of elections.  In all areas mentioned, exclusion 
along ethnic lines seems to have receded. 
 
Despite these major improvements between indigenous 
people and the State, no relevant positive changes have taken 
place amongst the attitudes of indigenous people toward 
other citizens, particularly toward those who are critical of 
the country‘s political system.  Independent of different 
socioeconomic factors, Bolivia‘s indigenous citizens are now 
shown as being less tolerant than non-indigenous.  This 
difference is recent, and contrasts with pre-MAS data, when 
indigenous people appeared to be more tolerant than non-
indigenous Bolivians. 
18 
 
Finally, the evidence also shows that treating indigenous 
people as one general category can be problematic under 
certain circumstances.  Relevant differences have been found 
between distinct indigenous groups, at least in terms of their 
levels of satisfaction with the country‘s democracy, and in 
terms of their political tolerance.  This means that particular 
identities can be stronger and more relevant than the general 
and commonly employed ―indigenous‖ categories; this 
finding is consistent with demands for the recognition of 
particular identities by many indigenous organizations, not 
only in Bolivia, but in different Latin American countries.  
Add to this fact the difficulty mentioned in assessing who the 
indigenous populations actually are and one sees the 
necessity for scholars and students of indigenous politics in 
Bolivia to pay more attention to the processes and dynamics 
particular to each distinct ethnic identity, instead of assuming 
homogeneity under the broader ―indigenous‖ category. 
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APPENDIX 
 
1. Ethnic identification questions 
Racial self-identification 
 
ETID. ¿Usted se considera una persona blanca, mestiza, 
indígena u originaria, negra o Afro-boliviana, mulata u 
otra?  
( ) Blanca        ( ) Mestiza       ( ) Indígena/originaria      
( ) Negra o Afro-boliviana  ( ) Mulata     ( ) Otra         
( ) NS         ( ) NR 
 
Cultural self-identification (question employed in the Bolivian 2001 
Census) 
 
BOLETID2. [Census] ¿Se considera perteneciente a alguno de los 
siguientes pueblos originarios o indígenas? [Leer todas las opciones] 
( ) Quechua          ( ) Aymara        ( ) Guaraní                  
( ) Chiquitano      ( ) Mojeño  
( ) Otro nativo             ( ) Ninguno      ( )  Otros 
_____________ (especificar)    ( ) NS        ( ) NR 
 
Language spoken during childhood question 
 
LENG1. ¿Cuál es su lengua materna, o el primer idioma que habló 
de pequeño en su casa? [acepte una alternativa, no más] [No leer 
alternativas] 
( ) Castellano   ( )  Quechua   ( ) Aymara   ( ) Guaraní   ( ) Otro 
(nativo)    ( ) Otro extranjero  ( ) NS    ( ) NR 
 
Results for each variable (percentages for 2010) 
 
 Indigenous Non-Indigenous 
Cultural ID 72 28 
Racial ID 19 81 
First language 24 76 
 
2. Dependent variables 
Support for democracy 
 
ING4. Puede que la democracia tenga problemas, pero es mejor que 
cualquier otra forma de gobierno. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en 
desacuerdo con esta frase? 
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Satisfaction with democracy 
 
PN4. En general, ¿usted diría que está muy satisfecho(a), satisfecho(a), 
insatisfecho(a) o muy insatisfecho(a) con la forma en que la democracia 
funciona en Bolivia? 
 
Support for the political system 
 
B1. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los tribunales de justicia de Bolivia 
garantizan un juicio justo?  
 
B2. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted respeto por las instituciones políticas de 
Bolivia? 
 
B3. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los derechos básicos del ciudadano 
están bien protegidos por el sistema político boliviano? 
 
B4. ¿Hasta qué punto se siente usted orgulloso(a) de vivir bajo el sistema 
político de Bolivia? 
 
B6. ¿Hasta qué punto piensa usted que se debe apoyar al sistema político 
de Bolivia? 
 
Voting participation 
 
VB2. ¿Votó usted en las últimas elecciones presidenciales de 2009? 
 
Political tolerance 
 
D1. Hay personas que siempre hablan mal de la forma de gobierno de 
Bolivia, no sólo del gobierno de turno, sino del sistema de gobierno, ¿con 
qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted el derecho de votar de esas 
personas?  
 
D2. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas 
puedan llevar a cabo manifestaciones pacíficas con el propósito de 
expresar sus puntos de vista? Por favor léame el número. 
 
D3. Siempre pensando en los que hablan mal de la forma de gobierno de 
Bolivia. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas 
puedan postularse para cargos públicos? 
 
D4. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas 
salgan en la televisión para dar un discurso? 
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3. Results 
 
Mean satisfaction with democracy by ethnic identity, 2010 (0 to 100 
scale) 
 
Group Mean Linearized std. 
error 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Quechua 59.8 0.932 58.0 61.7 
Aymara 61.7 1.049 59.6 63.7 
Other indigenous 50.9 1.608 47.7 54.1 
None (No 
indigenous) 
51.9 1.218 49.5 54.3 
 
Predictors of system support, 2000 and 2010 (Linear regression) 
 
 2000 2010 
Coefficient t Coefficient t 
Indigenous (racial 
self-ID) 
-4.89** -3.56 5.77** 5.54 
Income 0.54 1.71 -0.13 -0.59 
Education -0.11 -1.21 0.04 0.44 
Gender (female) -1.61* -2.2 0.82 1.13 
Age -0.06* -2.12 0.01 0.37 
N/R square 2631 .009 2414 .014 
* p < .05; **p < .01 
 
Predictors of tolerance, 2004 and 2010 (Linear regression) 
 
 2004 2010 
Coefficient t Coefficient t 
Indigenous (cultural 
self-ID) 2.20* 2.32 -6.31** -6.35 
Government 
approval -0.08** -3.38 -0.13** -5.55 
System support 0.11** 4.94 0.01 0.51 
Income -0.02 -0.17 0.04 0.4 
Education 0.13 0.34 -0.10 -0.36 
Gender (female) -1.81* -2.06 -1.10 -1.24 
Age -0.08** -2.86 -0.10** -3.19 
N/R square 2605 .020 2325 .049 
* p < .05; **p < .01 
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